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REVIVAL OF A SECOND OR SUBSEQUENT MORT-
GAGE, UPON REACQUISITION OF TITLE BY
THE ORIGINAL MORTGAGOR, AFTER
FORECLOSURE OF A FIRST
MORTGAGE
By JOSEPH G. WOOD AND RICHARD H. OBERREICH*
Early in 1934 the Legal Department of the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation in Indiana issued a ruling that where a
mortgagor regains title to real estate, after foreclosure, upon
which he had executed a first and second mortgage, the sec-
ond mortgagee either not having been joined or having been
made a party but not having had his rights adjudicated, the
second mortgage immediately revives.
Ordinarily, the possibility of a mortgagor regaining title
after foreclosure is remote. The existence of so few cases
on this point substantiates that proposition. However, an
extraordinary number of foreclosures were filed during the
depression, following which the Home Owners' Loan Cor-
poration, a Governmental agency organized for the purpose
of assisting distressed home owners to retain or regain their
property, amounted to a medium through which a home lost
through foreclosure could be recovered, and, therefore, this
question becomes more vital in importance because many
mortgagors were enabled to recover their homes lost through
foreclosure.
At the outset, we may state that we are of the opinion that
the Indiana ruling above referred to correctly states the law
and that a second or subsequent mortgage will revive after
foreclosure unless such second or subsequent mortgage is fully
adjudicated in the foreclosure proceedings. We find no Indi-
*Joseph G. Wood of the Indianapolis Bar, Dean of the Indiana Law
School, and former Indiana Counsel for Home Owners Loan Corporation.




ana authority to fully support the rule, but there is respect-
able authority for the rule in other states.
At the outset, also, it must be remembered that in Indiana
a second mortgagee is a proper party defendant in a suit to
foreclose the first mortgage, but the second mortgage need
not necessarily be foreclosed in that proceeding. The sec-
ond mortgagee may default or he may answer and yet not
have his second mortgage foreclosed or adjudicated, and it
is in those cases that this question becomes involved. The
default or failure to foreclose on the part of the second mort-
gagee does not prevent the first mortgagee from proceeding
with his foreclosure, and, upon sheriff's sale to satisfy the
first mortgage, the title is good in the purchaser at such
sheriff's sale as against such second mortgagee and title is
further good in any subsequent purchaser, from such sheriff's
sale purchaser, except and until the title gets back to the
original mortgagor, in which case the second mortgage, not
having been adjudicated, immediately revives. This rule ap-
plies where the mortgagor was obligated under a covenant to
pay such second mortgage and where such second mortgage
contained a "warranty" clause. It appears that the "war-
ranty" clause is the key to the principle, the word "warranty"
in our modern mortgage meaning that the mortgagor war-
rants or guarantees the title for the protection of the mort-
gagee.
In holding that such second mortgages revive, the courts
have, generally speaking, followed three distinct theories.
The first-The Payment Theory-is subject to consider-
able criticism and is the least well settled. It is the theory
that where a first mortgage is foreclosed, the rights of the
second mortgagee not being adjudicated, sale being made by
the sheriff and the property purchased by the mortgagor, the
payment of the money to the sheriff operates merely as a
payment of the first mortgage and leaves the second mort-
gage in force and in full effect.
The basis of this ruling is that the mortgagor had agreed
to pay the first mortgage. If he had paid it off when the debt
became due, of course the second mortgage would still be a
lien. The fact that he paid it off after foreclosure of the
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mortgage did not really alter the situation. In the words of
the Chancellor in the case of Otter v. Lord Faux, et al,1
decided in 1856 that an attempt to set up a title acquired
under the power of sale of the first incumbrancer as against a
subsequent incumbrancer "would be sacrificing substance to
form. The case is therefore to all intents and purposes that
of a mortgagor liable to pay a sum of money to his first in-
cumbrancer, paying it and getting a transfer, but that trans-
fer is something which upon general principle he cannot set
up against a creditor claiming by title subsequent to that of
the person whose charge he has so paid off."
In the case of Hilton v. Bissell,2 in reaching the same con-
clusion the court took the view that the mortgagor was bound
by his covenants to pay off the first mortgage and would not
be permitted to take advantage of his own wrong in failing
to do so.
The first case cited apparently is based solely on the theory
that the transfer to the mortgagor upon payment of the
amount due on the first mortgage operated merely as a pay-
ment and that, although sale of the property was made, in
substance this was merely operated to wipe out the debt to
the first incumbrancer. The second case cited, although
reaching the same conclusion, is based on the theory that the
mortgagor was bound by his covenants to pay the first mort-
gage, that in so doing he was merely doing his duty, there-
fore he would not be permitted to take advantage of his own
wrong in establishing in himself a title free from the lien of
the second mortgage.
In those cases in which the theory of payment is not ac-
cepted, it is found that usually the facts differ sufficiently
so that the conclusions may be readily justified, at the same
time accepting the payment theory as being sound. In the
case of Commerczal-Germanza Trust and Sacvzngs Banln v.
Russell, et al,3 a Louisiana case, it was decided that a second
lien did not revive upon reacquisition of the title. The fea-
ture distinguishing it from the facts in the cases cited above
143 English Reprints 13 81.
2 1 Sandf. Ch. 407.
3 86 So. 831 (1921).
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is the fact that title upon sale of the property by sheriff passed
to a third party, thence to the mortgagor The court rea-
soned immediately upon foreclosure the second lien was ex-
tinguished, the purchaser took his title free and clear of all
incumbrances, this being a well-recognized principle, and the
title that the purchaser received was entirely distinct from any
previous title. Obviously, title could not be in both the third
party who purchased at the sale and the mortgagor and "the
assertion that the foreclosure was a mere payment and not
a sale, and that the title continued to remain in the Russells
(mortgagors) is therefore nothing more or other than a
denial of the plain and admitted fact that there was a sale
to the homestead association (third party) " In this case
the court distinguished this case from others cited by counsel
for the plaintiff by saying that those cases had application
only where the mortgage debtor himself was the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale.
One case, recently handed down by the Texas Court of
Civil Appeals, 4 in which the mortgage debtor purchased the
property at the sale, holds that the theory of payment is not
sound. The reasoning relied upon by the court was that the
remedy of the second lien holder lay in his right to bid at the
sale of the property upon foreclosure of the first mortgage
and that his failure to do so extinguished his rights in the
property, even though the mortgage debtor might re-
acquire it.
The second-The Covenant to Defend Title Theory-is
based upon the effects of covenants of warranty contained in
the second mortgage. The principle involved is set out clearly
in the case of Merchants National Bank v. Miller,5 a North
Dakota case, in which it is stated that "the mortgagor agreed
with the plaintiff (the second mortgagee) that he would
defend this title to the premises against all lawful claims, and
therefore he agreed to defend it against the first mortgage."
Apparently the court was of the opinion that the foreclosure
of the first mortgage operated as a breach of the warranty in
472 S. W (2nd) 1103.
5 229 N. W 357.
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the second to defend the title against anyone attempting to
enforce a paramount title.
Under this principle, there is a wide divergence of opinion
among various courts relative to one point, i. e., whether or
not a provision in the second mortgage in substance as fol-
lows, "Subject however to a first mortgage in the amount of
........ Dollars," affects the liability of the debtor in the event
he reacquires title.
In the North Dakota case above cited, the court held that
this provision in the second mortgage in no way affected the
warranty, stating that "the covenant of warranty and to
defend that title is not restricted by the exception as to the
incumbrances." The fact that a restriction was placed on
the warranty against incumbrances does not in any way show
the parties intended to restrict and qualify the covenant of
warranty to defend. This view that the exception of the
first mortgage does not relieve the mortgagor from the force
of his covenant of warranty is not accepted in the case of
Sandwich Manufacturing Company v. Zellmer,0 a Minnesota
case, it being there held that the mortgagor excepted from
his covenant the first mortgage, therefore did not agree to
defend the title against the exercise of a paramount title by
the first mortgagee. Hence, after foreclosure of the first
mortgage, title being reacquired by the mortgagor, the second
mortgagee had no cause for complaint, inasmuch as the mort-
gagor had not agreed to defend the title against the mort-
gage that actually was foreclosed.
Which of these theories is preferable certainly would be
a matter of debate. Before going further, we might offer
this criticism of the theory expressed in the case of Merchants
National Bank v. Miller 7 That case holds that the mort-
gagor agrees with the second mortgagee that he will defend
the title to the premises against all lawful claims, therefore
agreeing to defend it against the first mortgage. In Bou-
vier's Law Dictionary, warranty is defined, "An assurance by
the grantor of an estate that the grantee shall enjoy the same
without interruption by virtue of paramount title." When
6 51 N. W 379.
7 229 N. W 357.
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a first mortgage is foreclosed and sheriff's deed issued, ob-
viously the interest of the second mortgagee in the title is dis-
turbed. It occurs to us that it is not the assertion of para-
mount title by the purchaser at the sale under the first mort-
gage that should be the proper theory of these cases. It is
the attempt of the mortgage debtor to assert a paramount
title upon reacquisition of the property, against which the
warranty will be good.
The third-The Covenant of Warranty of Title Theory-
is also based upon the warranty contained in the second mort-
gage. This theory we believe to be much the soundest, most
flexible and the one which may be properly called the law
This theory is concisely expressed in the case of Pancoast,
et al v. Travelers Insurance Company.8 In this case the de-
fendant in an action to foreclose attempted to attack his own
title to the mortgaged premises. The mortgage contained a
covenant of warranty The court says
"This he could not do. He is bound by and estopped from denying
his title to the mortgaged premises at the date of the mortgage, and,
where in the mortgage he has warranted the title, any title that he might
subsequently acquire would enure to the benefit of the mortgagee."
The mortgagor has warranted that the property described in
the mortgage shall be security for the debt. The pledge of
the property is a part of the consideration. It is the con-
tract duty of the mortgagor to produce the property if he
fails to pay the debt. If for some reason, such as foreclosure
of a first mortgage, title vesting in a third party, the mort-
gagor is prevented from producing the security, he is not
therefore relieved of his contract obligation but it is merely
postponed to such time as he will be able to fulfill it.
This theory is free from the objections to the other two
theories and we believe it works toward a fulfillment of the
real intention of the parties. We find one case cited supra
which substantiates the application of this principle to the
question considered. That is the case of Merchants National
Bank v. Miller,9 in which case appears the following"
8 79 Ind. 172.
9229 N. E. 357.
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"Our statute, Section 6731 of the Code (Comp. Laws 1913),
says: 'Title acquired by the mortgagor subsequent to the execution
of the mortgage inures to the mortgagee as security for the debt in like
manner as if acquired before the execution.'
"This applies to a case where the mortgagor had title, lost it, and
subsequently reacquired title, as much as it does to a case where the
mortgagor did not have title at first, but gave a mortgage and after-
wards acquired title."
It will be noted that the wording in this statute is almost
identical with the court's ruling in the Pancoast case and ex-
presses clearly the principle that we believe best.
Another case along the same line is Baird v. Chamber-
lain.10 Here the defendant had executed two mortgages on
his property The first was foreclosed and the mortgagee
was the purchaser. The mortgagor then went through bank-
ruptcy Subsequently he repurchased the property from the
first mortgagee. The question was then presented whether
the holder of the second mortgage could foreclose, inasmuch
as the acquisition of the property was subsequent to the mort-
gages in question, and after the discharge in bankruptcy
through repurchase from a first mortgagee who had acquired
the property by sheriff's deed on the foreclosure of its first
mortgage. The second mortgage provided "Mortgagor
hereby covenants with mortgagee that mortgagor is now
seized in fee simple of said premises, that mortgagee shall
enjoy same without lawful disturbance and mortgagor war-
rants same. Subject to first mortgage of $2000.00." The
court held the second mortgage revived. This decision is
based on the theory that the covenant of warranty in a sec-
ond mortgage will revive the lien. It concerns itself par-
ticularly with determining the effect of the phrase "subject
to first mortgage of $2,000.00." The court said, "We are
of the opinion that a recital in a mortgage that it is subject
to a prior mortgage is not properly construed as a qualifica-
tion of the covenants of warranty which bind the mortgagor
to protect the mortgagee against lawful disturbance and
against every person lawfully claiming the premises." The
10236 N. W 724.
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reasoning in this case is drawn from Merchant's National
Bank v. Miller"
We have considered the subject of this article largely from
the application of certain rules adopted in other jurisdictions,
and we may say here that we have by no means discussed all
the cases decided on this point, merely having stated the
principles that are generally accepted. So far as we have
been able to find, the specific point in issue has never been
raised in Indiana. There is one case, Burke, et al v. Abbott,
et all 2 which might be relied on, but only by analogy, to sub-
stantiate the payment theory
In a brief prepared by Henry C. Burnham, attorney for the
Title Insurance Corporation of Saint Louis, he said
"It has been held in many cases (and can probably be said to be the
general rule) that when a person executes two or more mortgages
or deeds of trust on the same land, a foreclosure under the senior mort-
gage will only temporarily extinguish or cut out a junior mortgage, if
the mortgagor subsequently acquires title to the land, and the junior
mortgage will be revived and reinstated as a valid lien against the
property (Jones on Mortgages, Sec. 1887, 1918 L. R. A., B. 770).
"The reason for the rule of revival or reintsatement is because of
the statutory warranty contained in the junior deed of trust. In most
states 'Grant, Bargain and Sell,' or some similar phrase, is a statutory
warranty, and after acquired title inures to the benefit of the grantees.
Hence, when the words, 'Grant, Bargain and Sell,' appear in the junior
deeds of trust or mortgages, a foreclosure of a prior lien will not cut
out the junior mortgages where the mortgagor buys the property at the
trustee's sale, and if a stranger buys at such sale, thereby extinguishing
the junior liens, they will be revived should the property be reconveyed
to the mortgagor. And if the land is sold subject to two mortgages,
which the grantee assumes and agrees to pay, said grantee cannot buy
at the foreclosure sale under the senior and cut out the junior mortgage.
Such a purchase is considered a payment of the senior lien (Jones on
Mortgages, Sec. 1887, Wiltsie on Mortgage Foreclosure, Sec. 775)."
He also cites Jensen v. Duke,'3 in which case one Jensen
executed a deed of trust to Abbott and then sold the prop-
erty to Duke, who executed a second deed of trust to Jensen.
11229 N. W 357.
12 103 Ind. 1.
13 71 Cal. App. 210, 234 Pac. 876.
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The first was foreclosed and the purchaser conveyed back to
Duke. This was an action to foreclose the Jensen deed of
trust. It was held that the Jensen deed of trust was revived
by inurement and that the ruling in Plumb v. Studebaker,14
is not the correct exposition of the law in California.
Another case cited in M. Burnham's brief is Martin v.
Raleigh State Bank.15 In this case one Martin executed a
deed of trust to the Raleigh State Bank which stated that it
was a second deed of trust. The first was foreclosed and the
title later became vested in Martin again. The second was
then foreclosed and the beneficiary bought in at the sale and
brought this suit for possession. The defense was that, by
virtue of the clause in the second deed of trust reciting that it
was second and subordinate to the first, the Raleigh State
Bank lost its rights to proceed against the land. It was held
that the doctrine of the Massachusetts court, as stated in
Huzzey v. Hefferman'8 is not applicable in this state, and
that the title Martin acquired subsequent to the execution of
the second deed of trust inures to the benefit of the beneficiary
of the latter.
Further cases cited in Mr. Burnham's brief that deal with
the revival of second mortgage theory are Plumb v. Stude-
baker Bros. Mfg. Co.,1 7 Hickman v. Dill,"' Moore v. Lind-
say,1 Sandwich Mfg. Co. v. Zellmer,20 and Huzzey v. Hef-
ferman.2 1
The third theory is simple and strictly in accord with the
agreement of the parties. Under this theory, as well as the
second, a question might arise if in the warranty the first
mortgage is excepted. It is our belief, however, that this
exception should be interpreted as a mere matter of form,
nothing more than an identification of a lien already existing
and superior from the standpoint of priority upon foreclosure,
14 89 Mo. 162.
15 111 So. (Miss.) 448.
16 143 Mass. 232, 9 N. E. 570.
17 89 Mo. 162.
18 39 Mo. App. 246.
19 52 Mo. App. 474.
20 48 Minn. 408, 51 N. W 379.
21 143 Mass. 232, 9 N. E. 570.
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but in no way affecting the agreement to produce the property
as security for the debt in the event of a default.
The examination of these and other authorities leads us to
believe that the only safe ruling where this question arises is
that the second lien reattaches, and it would be very dan-
gerous to pass a title where a mortgage debtor has reacquired
the title after foreclosure of a first mortgage where the inter-
ests of the second mortgagee were not adjudicated and the
second mortgage has not been released.
